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Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Henry A. Hentemann*
T HE CLAMOR OF SOCIOLOGISTS for the protection of the innocent
victim,' the threat of legislatures to enact compulsory in-
surance laws,2 and the fear of insurance companies that they
would be forced to underwrite the undesirable risk all have con-
tributed to the evolution of an insurance coverage geared to
protect against the irresponsible uninsured motorist.3
The problem of the uninsured motorist and the uncompen-
sated destruction he often leaves in his wake has long been a
matter of public concern. Some states have enacted laws to
provide compensation for damages caused by an uninsured
motorist by the formation of state-operated 4 or industry-operated
funds.5 The rights and procedural rules for presenting claims
against these funds are guided by the respective state statutes.
When the insurance industry began to write uninsured motorist
coverage, 6 other states enacted laws making it mandatory that
all contracting for automobile liability insurance in that state
* B.A., John Carroll University; Claims Examiner, Allstate Insurance Com-
pany; Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Murphy and Netherton, Public Responsibility and the Uninsured Motor-
ist, 47 Georgetown L. J. 700 (1959).
2 Moser, the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 406 Ins. L. J. 719 (Nov.
1956); Denny, Uninsured Motorists and the Virginia Court, 48 Va. L. R.
1177 (1962); Court, Virginia's Experience with the "Uninsured Motorist,"
3 W. & M.L.R. 237 (1962).
3 This particular insurance is usually called Family Protection Coverage.
4 New Jersey (1952), North Dakota (1957), and Maryland (1957) have cre-
ated Unsatisfied Judgment Funds.
5 New York enacted the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corpora-
tion Law in 1958 which created a non-stock corporation. All the com-
panies writing automobile liability insurance in that state were made mem-
bers and operated the corporation. Virginia established the Uninsured
Motorist fund in 1958 and all claims are distributed among the automobile
liability carriers in proportion to the number of policies written. See, supra,
n. 2.
6 The first form of this coverage was introduced in January 1954 and was
only payable after the insured reduced his claim against the uninsured to
judgment. Some judgments by default were not collectible. In October
1955 carriers in New York offered two forms of coverage. In December
1956 the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insur-
ance Rating Bureau made available an Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
to the family automobile policyholder and afforded protection when an
occupant of a vehicle and also when a pedestrian. Rice, Uninsured Motorist
Ins.; California's latest answer to the problem of the financially irresponsi-
ble motorist, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 516 (1960).
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were also to be provided with coverage against the uninsured
motorist.7 The remaining states have no remedial laws pertain-
ing to an unsatisfied claim caused by an uninsured motorist, and
the subscription of insurance coverage against such a loss is left
to the volition of the individual.
This article is concerned with the insurance contract that
provides this unique coverage and the legal problems that sur-
round some of its major provisions. Many of these, however, are
not yet fully resolved. This is due to the relatively early stage
of its development and to the fact that existing decisions are too
few and too fragmentary to permit a statement of controlling
rules or principless Nevertheless, the problems will be posed
and the principles of law and the cases will be explored. The
article will concern itself with the right of subrogation, the arbi-
tration clause and the applicable statute of limitations.
In view of the contractual nature of the insurance contract
and the large number of companies writing this coverage, many
policies will have clauses that differ slightly from others; but the
general principles are the same.
All compensations available under the uninsured motorist
coverage are limited to "bodily injury" sustained and the maxi-
mum recovery is the minimum limits required by the financial
responsibility laws of the state. 9 By virtue of lex loci contractus'°
this will be the minimum limits for the state in which the con-
tract is made. Virginia has also statutorily allowed the recovery
of property damage above a $200 deductible." The usual agree-
ment that the insurance company makes with the insured is to
pay:
All sums which the insured or his legal representative 12 shall
be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily in-
7 New Hampshire (1957), Virginia (1958), New York (1958), California
(1957), and Louisiana (effective October 1, 1962).
8 Annot., 79 A. L. R. 2d 1252.
9 The Uninsured Motorist Coverage did not provide coverage of policy
limit on each of two uninsured automobiles which simultaneously struck
the insured motorist, but was limited to aggregate payment of policy limit.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drewry, 191 F. Supp. 852 (D. C. Va.
1961). See also, supra, n. 2.
10 Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
11 Code of Virginia, Sec.: 38.1-381B (Supp. 1958). See, supra, n. 2.
12 Allstate Insurance Company does not include the words "or his legal
representative" in their Crusader Policy.
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jury, sickness or disease, including death resulting there-
from, hereinafter called "bodily injury," sustained by the
insured, caused by accident and arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile. 13
The import of this insuring clause is that the company agrees to
pay damages to the insured or legal representative for bodily
injury sustained by the insured. The insured is defined within
the same section of the policy as being the named insured and
any relative14 or any person while occupying an insured auto-
mobile, and
any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover
for care or loss of services because of bodily injury to which
this coverage applies. 15
As a condition precedent to recovery under this coverage
by those who fall within the class of insureds is that their bodily
injury be caused by an uninsured automobile. An uninsured
automobile for this purpose is defined to mean:
an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance
or use of which there is no bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with
respect to any person or organization legally responsible for
the use of such automobile. 16
The term is also meant to include a trailer of any type and a
"hit-and-run" automobile provided there is compliance with cer-
tain conditions.'
However, when payment is made under this coverage, one
of the first questions for consideration is the right of the insur-
ance company to recover that payment made to the insured for
13 Custom-Rite Family Automobile Policy, Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company.
14 A relative is defined within the policy to mean a relative of the named
insured who is a resident of the same household.
15 Supra, n. 13.
10 Ibid.
17 There must have been physical contact with the hit-and-run automobile;
the identity of either the operator or the owner of such hit-and-run auto-
mobile cannot be ascertained; the insured or someone on his behalf shall
have reported the accident within 24 hours to a police, peace or judicial
officer or to the commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed with
the company within 30 days thereafter a statement under oath that the
insured has a cause of action arising out of such accident for damages
against a person or persons whose identity is unascertainable, and setting
forth the facts in support thereof; and the automobile the insured was
occupying shall be made available for inspection at the company's request.
Supra, n. 13.
Jan., 1963
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damages caused by a tortiously liable third party, the uninsured
motorist.
Subrogation
The uninsured motorist coverage contains a provision en-
titled the Trust Agreement which states that in the event of
payment to any person under this coverage:
a. The company shall be entitled to the extent of such pay-
ment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that
may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery
of such person against any person or organization legally
responsible for the bodily injury because of which such
payment was made.
b. Such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the
company all rights of recovery which he shall have
against such other person or organization because of the
damages which are the subject of claim made under this
part.' 8
The provision further states that the party shall do what is
proper to secure and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice
rights of the company and shall cooperate in every way in their
efforts to recover from the uninsured motorist.
Upon settlement with the company and in compliance with
the above quoted provision, the insured to whom payment has
been made signs a trust agreement. Is the nature of this agree-
ment an assignment of a bodily injury claim or is it a legal sub-
rogation agreement? The jurisdiction in which it is entered
into will be of importance in determining the legal enforce-
ability of a personal tort assignment.
A right of action for a purely personal tort, in the absence
of a statute granting otherwise, is not subject to assignment. 19
The common law does not permit assignments of causes of ac-
tion to recover for personal injuries.2° One reason given for
this is that such actions do not survive at common law. Some
jurisdictions have logically concluded therefore that personal
injury actions are assignable where statutory provision has been
made for the survival of such claims.2 1 Other courts have made
18 Supra, n. 13.
19 Annot., 40 A. L. R. 2d 501.
20 Id. at 502.
21 Id. at 508, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, South
Carolina, Texas, Wisconsin.
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a distinction between assignment of the right to recover and the
right to the recovery 22 notwithstanding that the cause of action
could not be assigned.
In the case of Pittsburgh, C., C., & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Volkert
et al., 23 co-defendant Quatkemeyer made an assignment after
judgment to his attorney, Muller, of one half interest in that
judgment for legal services rendered and to be rendered in his
action against the plaintiffs for personal injuries. Muller then
further assigned it to defendant Volkert. The plaintiff contended
that this was a partial assignment without consent of the debtor
and an unenforceable assignment not recognized at law. The
court stated that the question was not whether such an assign-
ment can be recognized and enforced at law, but whether it
can be made the basis of a proceeding in equity. Speaking of
the assignment itself, the court stated that in equity it amounted
to an assignment of the debt and would be enforced in equity, al-
though the debtor had not assented thereto, and the same would
apply to the case of an assignment of part of a debt. In each
case, a trust would be created in favor of the equitable assignee
of the fund and would constitute an equitable lien upon it. The
court further stated that some authorities deem such a transfer
to create an interest in the fund in the nature of an equitable
property; others have denominated it an equitable assignment.
But, whatever term is used to describe it, the result reached is
to give to the assignee a property right in the thing assigned
which is cognizable by and enforceable in a court of equity.
This case allows and renders enforceable in equity an as-
signment of a part of a recovery after such recovery is obtained
but gives no right to the assignee to bring an action at law
against the tort-feasor alone.24
The assignment of the right itself and rendering the assignee
a party to the action against the tort-feasor has been considered
in a malicious prosecution action in the case of State ex rel. Crow
v. Weygandt25 where Mr. Crow sought to be made a party to
the case on the ground that he had acquired a financial interest
in the cause by an assignment by the original party plaintiff.
22 Id. at 512, Arizona, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio.
23 58 Ohio St. 362, 50 N. E. 924 (1898).
24 See Pennsylvania Co. v. Thatcher, 78 Ohio St. 175, 85 N. E. 55 (1908).
25 170 Ohio St. 81, 162 N. E. 2d 845 (1959).
Jan., 1963
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In that case the Ohio Supreme Court held that the action for
malicious prosecution does not survive and such cause of action,
therefore, cannot be assigned. In Goings v. Black26 the court
was confronted with a similar situation but this time involving
an assignment of a personal injury action which did survive by
virtue of a statute. The assignment was made to a disbarred at-
torney who attempted to circumvent the disbarment by virtue
of the assignment. He contended it was enforceable because of
the survivorship provision in the statute claiming that he, there-
fore, acquired a financial interest and could be a party to the
case. The Common Pleas Court stated that the Ohio decisions
uphold contingent fees of attorneys in tort litigation not as as-
signments in law as "parties" but merely as equitable assign-
ments which cannot be enforced in a suit at law at the instance
of the assignee alone against the tort-feasor. As to one whose
rights to practice law have been terminated, such an assignment
is obviously against public policy and unenforceable. This de-
cision was affirmed on appeal.27
It seems that the Ohio courts tend to disapprove of an as-
signment of the right of action itself, although the state Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Crow28 made its ruling on the fact that
malicious prosecution did not survive. The logical implication
seems to be that if the action did survive, the assignment of the
cause of action would be enforceable. Also, both cases dealt with
a disbarred attorney who took such an assignment. The ques-
tion now is: if the Ohio courts were to hold the trust agreement
entered into upon settlement of a claim under the uninsured
motorist coverage to be an assignment, would they allow the
company to be a "party" since the cause of action assigned is one
that survives. This has not been determined, but the tendency
seems against such a holding. However, by virtue of the decisions
that allow an equitable assignment of the recovery, the com-
pany should be able to enforce the trust agreement in equity.
The next consideration is the effect the trust agreement will
have in a state where any assignment of a personal tort is strictly
prohibited. Illinois is such a state. The Illinois Appellate Court
was recently called upon to decide that very question with re-
spect to the trust agreement signed upon settlement of an unin-
26 164 N. E. 2d 925 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1960).
27 182 N. E. 2d 641 (Ohio App. 1961).
28 Supra, n. 25.
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sured motorist claim. In the case of Remsen v. Midway Liquors
Inc. and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company,29 the
uninsured tort-feasor was intoxicated. Settlement was made with
the insurance company under the uninsured motorist coverage,
and a release and trust agreement was signed. Under the Dram
Shop laws of Illinois the injured party was allowed to bring an
action against the taverns that served the intoxicated driver.
Such an action was initiated in this case. The insurance com-
pany joins in the action as an intervener by virtue of the trust
agreement and claims a right to recover the amount they paid
from any recovery the insured might get. The contention was
made by the insured that the trust agreement was in its nature an
assignment of a personal injury tort which is prohibited in the
State of Illinois. The court in this case, however, ruled other-
wise and held the agreement to be a legal subrogation. The
reasoning followed by the court was that the word assignment
has a comprehensive meaning, and in its most general sense, is
a transfer or making over to another of the whole of any prop-
erty, real or personal, in possession or in action, or of an estate
or right therein. Subrogation, however, is founded on principles
of justice and equity, and its operation is governed by principles
of equity. It rests on the principle that substantial justice should
be attained regardless of form; that is, its basis is the doing of
complete, essential and perfect justice between the parties with-
out regard to form.
As a general rule, any person, who, pursuant to a legal ob-
ligation to do so, has paid, even indirectly, for a loss or injury
resulting from the wrong or default of another will be subro-
gated to the rights of the creditor or injured person against the
wrongdoer or defaulter, persons standing in the place of the
wrongdoer, or others who are primarily responsible for the wrong
or default.30
The Illinois court also pointed out that in the case of New
York Casualty Company v. Sinclair Refining Company3' it was
stated that the doctrines of subrogation and a constructive trust
are analogous. The creditor is regarded as holding his claim
against the principal debtor and his securities, therefore, in trust
for the subrogee.
29 30 Ill. App. 2d 132, 174 N. E. 2d 7 (1961).
30 83 C. J. S. 616.
31 108 F. 2d 65, 71 (C. A. 10, 1939).
Jan., 1963
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An interesting analogy lies in the nature of assignments of
personal tort and fraud claims. Both of these are prohibited in
law and equity by some states as being contrary to public policy.
However, in Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Johnson32 a claim was
made by the insured under a policy of forgery insurance. The
company paid thereunder and in consideration of the payment
the insured executed and delivered a loan receipt for the amount
paid. The receipt provided that the loan was repayable only to
the extent of any net recovery that the insured might obtain.
The court concluded that the instrument in question was not an
assignment of the fraud claim.
In the Remsen Case3 3 the court also went on to state that
the doctrine of subrogation has been steadily expanding; it is a
favorite of the law and has been nurtured and encouraged. It is
broad enough as now applied to include every instance in which
one person not acting as a mere volunteer or intruder pays a
debt for which another is primarily liable, and which in equity
and good conscience should have been discharged by the latter.
In Kirouac v. Healey34 a New Hampshire court, although not
deciding the issue of subrogation, discussed the uninsured
motorist policy and stated that it is not a contract to indemnify
the third party uninsured motorist against liability since the
contract is not for his benefit. The uninsured motorist's liability
will be unaffected by any payment made by the insurer, who
will then be subrogated to the insured's rights against the tort-
feasor.
Arbitration
Probably the most debated clause in the uninsured motorist
coverage and the phase that has received the most litigation is
the arbitration clause. A standard clause is as follows:
If any person making claim hereunder and the Company
do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto-
mobile because of bodily injury to the Insured, or do not
agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing
under this Part, then, upon written demand of either, the
matter or matters upon which such person and the Company
do not agree shall be settled by arbitration.35
32 317 Mass. 485, 58 N. E. 2d 849 (1945).
33 Supra, n. 29.
34 181 A. 2d 634 (N. H. Sup. Ct. 1962).
35 Supra, n. 13.
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The cases, however, that consider the enforceability of the
arbitration clause are usually precipitated by violations or non-
compliance with two other provisions applicable to this coverage.
One is an exclusion which states that this coverage does not
apply if:
Any person entitled to payment under this coverage shall,
without written consent of the Company, make any settle-
ment with or prosecute to judgment any action against any
person or organization who may be legally liable therefor.36
The other is a condition that states that no action shall be
against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto,
there shall have been full compliance with all the terms of the
policy.
The exclusion and condition are related to this topic, for
compliance therewith leaves no alternative but to arbitrate, and
non-compliance with the exclusion or the arbitration clause
would seem to render the coverage void because of the condition.
The legal questions that now arise are many. Is this agree-
ment a bargain or contract to relinquish one's rights to resort
to the courts? Is the question of liability a proper subject to be
determined by an arbitration committee? Is it against public
policy and unenforceable because it is a stipulation depriving the
courts of jurisdiction as to future controversies? Does it deprive
the insured of his right to have his disputes resolved by due
process of law? Is it an illegal limitation on the enforcement of
the right of action that the insured has? Further, does the insist-
ence upon the use of arbitration have the effect of denying the
insured any payment and, therefore, relieve him of any further
duty to comply with the terms of the policy?
The court decisions on this clause are varied and numerous.
Some have declared it to be valid, irrevocable and enforceable
and others have declared it void, unconstitutional and against
public policy. The court decisions, however, are usually in direct
relationship to the statutory authority, or lack thereof, sanction-
ing arbitration agreements.
Probably the most often quoted negative approach to the
subject for states that have no statutes on arbitration is the
Oklahoma case of Boughton v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.3 7
The plaintiff in that case did not submit to arbitration a claim
86 Ibid.
37 354 P. 2d 1085 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1960).
Jan., 1963
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under the uninsured motorist's coverage but sued the motorist
without the consent of the company. The plaintiff obtained a
judgment and then sued on the policy. The company contended
that no action should be taken against the insurer except upon
compliance with all policy terms as a condition precedent which
the plaintiff failed to perform. The court pointed out that Okla-
homa had no arbitration statute and common law governed. The
court held that the arbitration clause was contrary to public
policy and unenforceable because it was a stipulation depriving
the courts of jurisdiction as to future controversies, and that the
clause which stated that no action could be brought against the
uninsured without the consent of the company was void under
a statute which nullified agreements restricting parties from en-
forcing contractual rights by the usual legal proceedings and
ordinary tribunals. In answer to the defendant's contention
that the policy was voided because there was not compliance
with all the terms of the policy, the court stated that the es-
sential part of the contract for which consideration was paid
was insurance protecting against uninsured motorists, not a
method for determining liability. Those clauses were held to be
void and unenforceable.
In the case of Childs v. Allstate Insurance Company38 the
Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that the arbitration
clause of the uninsured motorist coverage was unenforceable
under the decisions of that state. The defendant cited many New
York cases, but the South Carolina court distinguished them on
the grounds that New York upheld the agreement under its
Civil Practice Act of which South Carolina had no counterpart.
Such an agreement is upheld in South Carolina when it pro-
vides for arbitration of the amount of loss but not when it under-
takes to require arbitration of the question of liability. Matthews
v. Allstate Insurance Company39 in a Virginia court stated that
a statute of that state specifically nullified the effectiveness of the
arbitration provision of the uninsured motorist policy.
These are a few examples of how states without statutory
authority might consider and treat the arbitration clause of the
uninsured motorist provision. However, the majority of states
have general arbitration statutes and litigation on the subject.
The laws vary to the degree that some would seem not to allow
38 237 S. C. 455, 117 S. E. 2d 867 (1961).
39 194 F. Supp. 459 (E. D. Va. 1961).
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arbitration of future controversies 40 while others would; 41 some
consider the agreement irrevocable42 and others revocable until
submitted to the arbitrators.43 Just exactly how these states
would consider the arbitration clause of the uninsured motorist
coverage cannot be categorically stated, but it would seem rea-
sonable to assume that if statutory sanctions were given to agree-
ments to arbitrate future controversies, they would also uphold
the policy provision.
In Kirouac v. Healey44 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
considered by way of dictum whether the insured who obtained
a judgment against the uninsured with the consent of the com-
pany could then sue the company for the judgment obtained.
The court considered that the arbitration provisions of the policy
were a voluntary waiver of the plaintiff's right to a jury trial
against the insurer, that arbitration agreements are made valid
in that jurisdiction, that it was a voluntary agreement, and that
the plaintiff should be bound by the agreement to arbitrate even
after judgment was obtained with the consent of the company.
The judgment would merely establish the fact that he was legally
entitled to recover from the uninsured.
Chief Judge Conway of the New York Court of Appeals
stated, in an opinion 45 relating to the general arbitration statute
of that state, that before the adoption of that law in 1920
A party might disregard his agreement to arbitrate all
disputes under a contract, for such agreements were held to
be attempts to 'oust a court of law or equity jurisdiction,'
and there was no effective means to enforce them. It was
only through acts of legislature that these difficulties were
removed. The legislature has provided a means of enforcing
that which was previously unenforceable. (The parties)
must use those means or none at all.
In the Matter of Spectrum Fabrics Corporation46 the New
York court said the fact is that an agreement to arbitrate, as
40 McLaughlin, Arbitration Under Uninsured Motorist Insurance, 473 Ins.
L. J. 358 (June 1962): Del., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md., Miss., Mo.,
Mont., Neb., N. M., N. C., N. D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, W. Va.
41 Id., Ariz., Cal., Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Hawaii, Ill., La., Nev., Mass.,
Mich., Minn., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Ohio, Oregon, Fla., R. I., Wash., Wis., Wyo.
42 Ibid.
43 McLaughlin, supra, n. 40, Del., Md.
44 Supra, n. 34.
45 American Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 297 N. Y. 322, 79 N. E. 2d
425, 426 (1948).
46 285 App. Div. 710, 139 N. Y. S. 2d 612, 617 (1955).
Jan., 1963
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authorized by statute, is a contractual method for settling dis-
putes in which the parties create their own forums, pick their
own judges, waive all but limited rights of review or appeal,
dispense with the rules of evidence, and leave the issues to be
determined in accordance with the sense of justice and equity
that they believe reposes in the breasts and minds of their self-
chosen judges. This case has been quoted in cases considering
the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist coverage.
47
New York, by virtue of the Civil Practice Act of that state,
has recognized and enforced the arbitration clause of the un-
insured motorist policy. This state has been a forerunner in
this field of insurance and has the majority of the cases on the
subject. Of all the disputes that may arise under the uninsured
motorist coverage, which are to be considered proper subjects
for arbitration? This question has resulted in various decisions.
There have been cases that held the scope of the arbitration
clause did not extend to questions of coverage or whether the
automobile causing the damage was one that qualified as "un-
insured" within the meaning of the policy.48 These were held to
be questions that should be determined in a court of law before
proceeding further. The case most referred to under this theory
is the Application of Phoenix Assurance Company49 which stated
that the arbitration clause under the uninsured motorist cover-
age was limited only to the issue of negligence and the resulting
question of damages.
The courts that follow this line of cases predicate their
arguments on a strict interpretation of the wording in the agree-
ment. They hold that the phraseology of the policy is such that
the fact that the damages arose from an "uninsured" motorist is
a condition precedent and should be litigated or proven before
the arbitration of his legal right to recover from such uninsured
motorist is begun. However, their view is determined by an in-
terpretation of the words used in the provision which has also
been subjected to another interpretation.
In other cases the courts have given a broad scope to the
clause and have considered the question of whether the automo-
bile is insured or uninsured to be a proper matter for considera-
tion in the arbitration proceeding.
47 Schiller v. Cosmopolitan Mutual Cas. Co. of N. Y., 191 N. Y. S. 2d 852
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
48 Supra, n. 8.
49 9 App. Div. 2d 998, 194 N. Y. S. 2d 770 (1959).
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In the Application of Travelers Indemnity Company5" it was
held that the ambiguity should be resolved against the insurer
which prepared it and that the arbitration clause encompassed a
dispute as to whether the automobile was insured or uninsured
under the terms of the contract. Later in Application of Zurich
Insurance Company5' the court gave greater scope to the arbi-
tration clause of the uninsured motorist coverage by stating that
the provision was not limited to the issue of negligence and re-
sulting question of damages, but may extend to other questions
of law and fact pertaining to the eligibility of the insured to
recover.
Both views co-exist in New York, and the only anticipation
of a ruling seems to depend upon which appellate division is to
determine the case. However, there are two recent cases
52
decided in the lower courts in the past several months which
have held the clause to have the narrower scope of only de-
termining negligence and damages.
Statute of Limitations
Another problem presented by the uninsured motorist cov-
erage is the effect that various statutes of limitations might have.
Is the provision to be governed by the tort statute of limitation
that would be effective in an action against the uninsured
motorist, or is it to be governed by the statute of limitations
applicable to an action on a written contract?
The policy states that the company agrees to pay:
All sums which the insured or his legal representative shall
be legally entitled to recover as damages.
53
The answer seems to lie in the interpretation and efficacy a
court will give to the phrase "legally entitled to recover."
One accepted interpretation of the phrase is that the com-
pany can set up any liability defense that the uninsured motorist
could have against the insured. The question is whether this is
to be limited to a liability defense based on the merits or will it
extend to personal defenses such as the statute of limitations?
50 26 Misc. 2d 513, 205 N. Y. S. 2d 741 (1960).
51 14 A. D. 2d 669, 219 N. Y. S. 2d 748 (1961).
52 Matter of McGuiness, 225 N. Y. S. 2d 361 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); Applica-
tion of Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 227 N. Y. S. 2d 886
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
53 Supra, n. 13.
Jan., 1963
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What is the nature of any action taken to collect under this
coverage-is it tort or contract?
In the case of Andrianos v. Community Traction Company
5 4
the plaintiff, a fare paying passenger on the defendant's bus, sus-
tained bodily injury when, through the negligence of the oper-
ator-employee, the bus was driven into a pillar of a viaduct.
The action was brought after the two year statute of limitations
applicable to bodily injury claims had run. A demurrer was
sustained. The plaintiff then brought the action on contract
under the theory of breach of implied warranty which had a six
year statute of limitations that had not yet run. The court stated
that the statute which provides that an action for bodily injury
shall be within two years governs all actions the real purpose of
which is to recover damages for injury to the person and losses
incident thereto. It makes no difference whether such action is
for a breach of contract or strictly in tort.
There are many cases such as this, especially arising out of
the doctor-patient relationship where the patient brings an ac-
tion for injuries after the statute has run and bases his claim on
implied contract. All of these have been held to "sound in tort,"
and the statute of limitations applicable to the specific tort is
held governing. However, these cases can be distinguished from
an action brought on this insuring contract. In the cases just
referred to, there exists a double liability exposure in both tort
and contract on the same liable party. The only relation the
insurance provision has to tort is that the insured must sustain
injuries caused by an uninsured tort-feasor before he has a right
to collect under the contract with the company.
The Andrianos case was distinguished in R & H Cartage
Company v. Fought55 wherein the plaintiff was subrogated to a
debt paid on behalf of Mid-America Highway Express Inc. The
defendant had a lease agreement with Mid-America and agreed
therein to pay for losses Mid-America sustained by defendant's
negligence in hauling for Mid-America. A&P Tea Company, a
consignee of Mid-America, sued Mid-America for loss sustained
by defendant's delay in delivery. The plaintiff paid the loss for
Mid-America and then sued the defendants after the two year
statute of limitations for recovery of damages to personal prop-
erty. The Ohio Appellate Court held that the action is brought
54 155 Ohio St. 47, 97 N. E. 2d 549 (1951).
55 111 Ohio App. 230, 171 N. E. 2d 549 (1951).
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for damages for breach of a contract of indemnity, the cause of
which would not arise until the refusal of the defendants to
comply on demand under the terms of its contract with Mid-
America.
The analogy of the R & H Cartage Company case to an un-
insured motorist coverage seems shockingly close by virtue of
the fact that therein exists a written contract to pay for tort
losses, and the court held that the contract statute of limitations
controlled, which did not go into effect until a demand was made
on the contract. However, the distinguishing factor is again the
fact that the defendant had both a tort and contract liability ex-
posure.
A further point of consideration is that disputes as to
whether the insured is legally entitled to damages and the
amount of such are to be resolved in arbitration. The next ques-
tion, therefore, is whether such personal defenses are available
to the company in arbitration.
The Remsen"6 case in Illinois indicated that liability defenses
are available to the company when it dismissed the plaintiff's con-
tention that the uninsured motorist coverage, medical payments
and disability income coverage were all of a kind. The court
said they were not since uninsured motorist coverage was only
collectible if the insured were legally entitled to collect from
the tort-feasor. All the New York cases agree that negligence
defenses were available and were considered properly arbitrable
issues. However, as was pointed out above, there are a few
jurisdictions in that state that follow the holding of the Zurich"7
case and give such broad scope to the arbitration clause that it
would be conceivable for the statute of limitations to be allowed
as a defense to the company or as grounds for a stay of arbitra-
tion. The unpredictable question is whether the court will follow
the broad or narrow viewpoint.
Another consideration is the right of subrogation that the
company has against the uninsured motorist upon settlement of
his claim with the insured. If the insured brought his action
after the statute of limitations had lapsed on his claim against
the uninsured, the company, being subrogated only to the rights
the insured had, would be deprived of its right to collect from
the uninsured motorist in subrogation.
56 Supra, n. 29.
57 Supra, n. 51.
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In the Application of Ceccarelli58 a lower court of New York
had to decide the question of which statute of limitations was
applicable. The petitioner had previously made a claim against
Travelers Insurance Company under their uninsured motorist
coverage but did not make a demand for arbitration until the
tort statute of limitation had lapsed. The court ruling was in
behalf of an application filed to compel the company to arbitrate.
The company contended that since no demand for arbitration
was made until after the tort statute had lapsed, the motion to
compel must be denied. The court, however, stated that the
petitioner's claim against the respondents is based not upon tort
but upon the insurance contract, although a tortious act of a
third party gives rise to the rights under the contract. Since the
claim is made on contract, the tort statute of limitations did not
apply.
In Application of Travelers Indemnity Company59 the peti-
tioner seeks a stay of arbitration proceedings on the ground of
estoppel for failing to comply with an alleged condition precedent
in the uninsured motorist contract. The company contends that
since the respondent did not institute an action against the un-
insured within the statutory time limit, he failed to protect the
company's rights as a possible subrogee under the trust agree-
ment contained in the policy, and that the defense of the statute
of limitations which the uninsured had was available to the
company. A claim was made against the company within the
time period set for tort actions, but the demand for arbitration
was not made until eight months after that statute had lapsed.
As to the applicable statute of limitations, the court stated that
the company's contention that they had become the insurers
of the uninsured motorist is but a conclusion without support.
The phrase "legally entitled to recover as damages" does not
mean legal liability for damages as determined by a court of law
in an action brought by the insured against the uninsured
motorist. The contract between the company and the insured
specified the manner of making such determination; namely, by
agreement or, if that failed, by arbitration. The court on this
point also cited the Phoenix60 case and stated that only matters
58 204 N. Y. S. 2d 550 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
59 226 N. Y. S. 2d 16 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
60 Supra, n. 49.
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of negligence, contributory negligence and damages could be
used by the company since these were all matters of substantive
law and legal defenses of the uninsured and that there was no
contract provision that the company succeeded to the uninsured
motorist's procedural defenses such as the statute of limitations.
As to company's contention that their subrogation rights
were defeated by the insured's failure to demand arbitration
on time and his failure to institute an action against the unin-
sured to protect such interests, the court stated that it was
based on a faulty premise that the company's obligation was no
greater than that of the uninsured motorist. The court stated
that the obligations of the company and of the uninsured are
not co-extensive. While the limits of the uninsured's obli-
gation are fixed by law, the extent of the insurance company's
obligation is fixed by contract. The company's obligations are in-
clusive of the uninsured's legal liability, but they extend by
contract beyond that area. The company is required under the
agreement to make a determination of respondent's claim by ne-
gotiation. Absent a settlement, the company is obliged by con-
tract to submit to a determination by arbitration.
The court also found that there was no obligation in the
contract requiring the insured to institute an action against the
uninsured to protect their possible subrogation rights and that
the company had no such rights under the trust agreement until
the company was obliged to pay the insured. Another element
the court made a point of was the fact that the insured notified
the company of the claim before the tort statute had lapsed
permitting the company to make payment and protect its rights
of subrogation by whatever action necessary.
Both of the New York cases cited above are lower court de-
cisions, and both seem to narrowly construe the defenses avail-
able to the company. An interesting factor that exists in each
case is that the company was notified of an uninsured motorist
claim before the tort statute of limitations had lapsed. The fact
that the company had time to protect their subrogation interest
was specifically noted and persuasive in the court's decision. How
they would have ruled if the first notification of such claim had
been made to the company after the statute had lapsed is difficult
to anticipate.
Another element which is given much consideration is the
arbitration clause existing in each policy and which is recog-
Jan., 1963
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
UNINSURED MOTORIST
nized and enforced in New York. As was pointed out above,
however, not all states recognize such clauses. In such a situa-
tion it is obvious how the tort statute would have to apply since
the action must be brought against the uninsured to establish
the right to collect under the coverage.
Virginia makes the uninsured motorist endorsement a man-
datory feature of every liability policy issued in that state.6 1
The statute which makes this the law nullifies the arbitration
clause and also empowers the insured to sue John Doe in the
event the tort feasor is unknown. It is required that before the
insured is entitled to recover under the endorsement, if the tort
feasor is unknown, a written report should be made to the Bu-
reau of Motor Vehicles within five days after the accident un-
less it can be shown that the insured was reasonably unable to
do so. In Doe v. Brown 2 the plaintiff failed to make such notice
to the state within the five day period and further failed to
show that he was reasonably unable to do so. The insurance
company, having statutory authority to represent John Doe in
this situation, contended that the time requirement was in effect
a statute of limitations contained within the contract, which had
lapsed. The company demurred to the action. The Virginia court
stated that this is not an action arising ex contractu to recover
against the insurance company on its endorsement. The insur-
ance company is not a named party defendant and judgment
cannot be entered against it in this action. This was considered
an action ex delicto since the cause of action arises out of a
tort, and the only issues presented are the establishment of
legal liability on the unknown uninsured motorist, John Doe, and
the fixing of damages if any.
In consideration of the cases existing on the subject, it seems
that the statute of limitations on a claim under the uninsured
motorist coverage would depend upon the efficacy the state gives
to the arbitration clause of the policy. In view of the stand
the New York courts have taken and the rationale behind their
decision, it would seem that a state that upholds the arbitration
clause 'might tend to consider the contract statute of limitations
as applicable. However, this cannot be categorically stated in
view of the early stage of legal development and the fact that
61 Supra, n. 11.
62 203 Va. 508, 125 S. E. 2d 159 (1962).
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there still exists a school of thought expressed in the Zurich63
case that the arbitration clause is to be given broad scope.
There is another point worthy of consideration under this
section. It is generally accepted that the statute of limitations is
a personal defense and part of procedural law. Further, it gen-
erally eliminates the remedy and not the right. However, the
exception to this is in actions that did not exist at common law
but which have been created by statute. When the statute of
limitations passes as to these actions, not only the remedy but
the right itself terminates. This is true of such actions as wrong-
ful death and survivorship. The question then arises as to what
effect these statutes of limitations will have upon a claim for
such under the uninsured motorist coverage. It seems reason-
able to state that under whatever view the courts take as to the
scope of the arbitration clause, these claims would be precluded
after the statute of limitations applicable thereto had lapsed. The
TravelersO4 case cited above, granting a narrow view to arbitra-
tion, stated that only non-negligence, contributory negligence
and damages were arbitrable and could be used by the company
since they were all matters of substantive law and legal de-
fenses of the uninsured. The statute of limitations as to statute
created actions has substantive force and is an absolute defense
of the uninsured. In these actions the statute of limitations be-
comes a matter of substantive and not merely procedural law
and is likely to be a defense available to the company.
Conclusion
It is obvious from what has been said that no conclusive or
categorical statement can readily be made as to how a court will
decide a particular dispute under this coverage. Some of the
approaches the courts have taken have been set forth. The cov-
erage is in a relative early stage of its development, but the
more litigation it is exposed to, the clearer the questionable areas
may become, allowing more forceful and reliable rules to be
established.
At the present, however, in spite of the scarcity of cases,
there seems to be a movement toward a strict interpretation of
the arbitration clause, granting a narrow scope to its field of op-
eration. As for the other phases, the best that can be done is to
watch and wait.
63 Supra, n. 51.
64 Supra, n. 59.
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